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Article 
The Fatally Flawed Theory of the 
Unbundled Executive 
Steven G. Calabresi† and Nicholas Terrell∗ 
  INTRODUCTION   
One of the most famous and celebrated decisions of the 
Framers of the U.S. Constitution was their decision to create a 
single unitary executive1 headed up by one President of the 
United States. The Framers considered creating a plural execu-
tive council, but they deliberately chose not to do so.2 The Fra-
mers’ decision to create a unitary executive is all the more star-
tling when we realize that the American states almost all had 
executive councils in the eighteenth century, and the federal 
government itself had an executive council under the Articles of 
Confederation to the extent it had any executive at all.3 The 
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 1. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CON-
STITUTION 131–32 (2005); STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE 
UNITARY EXECUTIVE 30–38 (2008); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Pra-
kash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 610–11 
(1994); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Ex-
ecutive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995) [hereinafter Calabresi, Some Normative Ar-
guments]; Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitu-
tion: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1179 (1992); 
Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor 
Ackerman Is Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. 
COMMENT. 51, 52–53 (2001) [hereinafter Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential 
Government]. 
 2. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he executive power is more easily confined when it is 
one: that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and 
watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the execu-
tive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.”). 
 3. See CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775–
1789, at 28–29, 57, 62–65 (1923). 
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Framers of the Constitution thus broke decisively and sharply 
with past American practice when they opted for a unitary ex-
ecutive.4  
This Article is about whether or not the Framers were 
right to create a unitary rather than a plural executive. For 
better or worse, the Framers’ unitary executive model has been 
followed by all fifty states in the sense that all the states elect 
only one governor, and not an executive council whose members 
jointly exercise the executive power.5 Many states, however, 
have diverged from the federal model by having other elected 
statewide officials, particularly an independently elected state 
attorney general.  
Which model is better: the federal or the state? We have 
been inspired to write about this question by a recently pub-
lished paper by Professors Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. 
Gersen of the University of Chicago, who argue that the Fra-
mers got it wrong when they opted for a unitary rather than a 
plural executive.6 Who is right as between Professors Berry and 
Gersen and Alexander Hamilton? Is a unitary executive optim-
al in a democracy like ours, or would an unbundled plural ex-
ecutive be better? That is the question this Article will address. 
It is critical at the outset to be clear that the idea of the un-
itary executive which we are defending does not concern the 
scope of the executive powers. It concerns who controls whatev-
er power the executive has. We are thus not defending a claim 
of inherent presidential power to act contrary to statutes with 
respect to foreign policy or wiretapping.7 We are defending 
presidential power to remove all subordinates in the executive 
branch for policy reasons. Part I fleshes out Professor Berry 
and Gersen’s argument against the unitary executive. Part II 
discusses ten arguments as to why we think Berry and Gersen 
are wrong.  
 
 4. See id. at 76–139. 
 5. Even those states with executive councils elect one clear governor as 
head of the executive branch. See MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. II, § 1, arts. I, IV; 
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, arts. 41, 60; N.C. CONST. art III, §§ 1, 8; Frederick Liu, The 
Constitutional Evolution of the State Executive 11 (May 19, 2008) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). 
 6. Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1385 (2008). 
 7. We are skeptical of the claims of inherent executive power put forth by 
the Bush administration, but think that much, although not all of what it did 
in waging the war on terror was authorized by Congress when it passed the 
post 9/11 Authorization for the Use of Military Force. See Pub. L. No. 107-40, 
115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
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I.  THE BERRY-GERSEN PROPOSAL OF THE  
UNBUNDLED EXECUTIVE   
Professors Berry and Gersen defend an “unbundling” of the 
executive power with clear, distinct, and differing policy dimen-
sions vested in independently elected and equal coexecutives.8 
Their model is the plural executive, which they say exists in 
state governments in this country where governors, state at-
torneys general, state secretaries of state, and comptrollers are 
all elected separately.9 Berry and Gersen claim that their pro-
posed partitioning of executive power solves the traditional 
weaknesses of executive councils—weaknesses which they con-
cede Alexander Hamilton exposed in The Federalist Papers.10 
Berry and Gersen argue that allowing voters to elect di-
rectly coexecutives for different policy dimensions will enhance 
accountability by allowing voters more choices.11 This will lead 
to a closer match between voter preferences and executive poli-
cies.12 They further claim that an increase in the number of 
elected officials in the executive branch will also increase the 
quality of administration as coexecutives focus on narrower 
areas of policy.13 A triumvirate of three presidents can do three 
times as much work as can only one. Berry and Gersen argue 
that the danger executive power inherently poses to the free-
dom of citizens by concentrating power is diminished with a 
plural executive.14 This enhances democratic control.15 They 
even argue that an unbundled plural executive might resist en-
croachments on executive power more vigorously in their own 
policy domains whereas a bundled executive might be tempted 
to acquiesce in legislative usurpation in one area to gain power 
in another.16 Finally, Berry and Gersen discuss the issue of 
presentment, or who should have the veto power. They imply 
that each coexecutive should hold the veto power over legisla-
tion that arises in his own policy dimension.17 
 
 8. Berry & Gersen, supra note 6, at 1403. 
 9. Id. at 1399–401. 
 10. Id. at 1403–04. 
 11. Id. at 1405. 
 12. Id. at 1396 (“Some unbundling of executive authority should reduce 
slack, making policy more democratic.”). 
 13. Id. at 1409–10. 
 14. Id. at 1415–16.  
 15. Id. at 1414. 
 16. Id. at 1408–09. 
 17. Id. at 1423. 
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Berry and Gersen concede that at some point, a multiplica-
tion in executive offices would become too costly to bear because 
of increased monitoring, coordination, and agency costs.18 A 
hundred-person executive would, they admit, be unwieldy.19 In 
a prior study, Berry and Gersen estimate that based on expend-
itures, the optimal number of elected executive and judicial of-
fices for local governments is approximately three.20 We disag-
ree with Berry and Gersen’s normative argument for a plural 
executive in the abstract. Consider the following ten arguments 
against a Berry-Gersen style divided executive power in our 
federal government today.  
II.  TEN REASONS WHY  
BERRY AND GERSEN ARE WRONG   
A.  THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE VERSUS THE CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEES 
The first reason why Berry and Gersen’s paper fails as a 
critique of the unitary executive is that their proposal is not re-
levant to the normative debate over whether the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s strongly unitary executive structure is a good or bad 
thing.21 Berry and Gersen repeatedly wink and nod in their pa-
per toward the claim that their thesis is relevant to the unitary 
executive debate.22 To see why this is wrong, consider the fol-
lowing point. 
 
 18. Id. at 1395. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Fiscal Consequences of 
Electoral Institutions 24–25 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper 
No. 344, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=996445. 
 21. For arguments in favor of the unitary executive, see Professor Cala-
bresi’s prior writings cited supra note 1. For arguments against, see Martin S. 
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); Abner S. 
Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 123 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and 
the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 22. Berry & Gersen, supra note 6, at 1386 (“Unfortunately, this early con-
fusion has been replicated over and over in more recent debates about the uni-
tary executive and the scope of executive authority.”); id. at 1409 (“Serving the 
interests of uniformity is sometimes said to require a single executive, a unita-
ry executive, or both.”); id. at 1413 (“[T]here is much overlap between the jus-
tification for a unitary executive and justifications for a single executive.”); id. 
at 1429 (“And to the extent the current constitutional structure would allow 
for modest adjustments toward the unbundled executive ideal, our work sug-
gests such reforms would produce a government structure more in keeping 
with the democratic ideals most commonly said to justify the single unitary 
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The normative argument for a unitary executive in the 
Federal Constitution rests on a key point that Berry and Ger-
sen never address. The unitary executive debate has not been 
about whether three nationally elected co-presidents are better 
than one, but has focused instead on whether bureaucrats and 
agencies should be controlled by the nationally elected Presi-
dent or by the representatives of small, interest-group-captured 
committee chairs accountable only to the voters of one state or 
congressional district.23 There are two potential leaders who 
compete for the allegiance in law execution of every subordi-
nate official in the executive branch, from the Secretary of 
State on down to the lowest level policy-making bureaucrats. 
On the one hand, there is the President, elected by a national 
majority, filtered through the electoral college, and always ac-
countable to that majority as reflected in his approval ratings 
in national public opinion polls. On the other hand, there are 
the congressional oversight and appropriations committees and 
their chairs who represent particular, small, idiosyncratic con-
gressional districts and states and who tend to be captured by 
special-interest groups.24 The unitary executive debate is not 
about whether in theory three nationally elected co-presidents 
are better than one: instead, it is a debate over whether bu-
reaucrats and agencies ought to be controlled by the nationally 
elected President or by the representatives of small, interest-
group-captured committee chairs accountable only to the voters 
of one state or congressional district. 
Presidents and their aides compete with congressional 
committee chairs and their aides on a day to day basis for con-
trol of subordinates in the executive branch.25 Congressional 
committees have powerful weapons at hand because they have 
the power of the purse, the ability to attach appropriations rid-
 
executive.”). 
 23. See Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 1, at 81–86. 
 24. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Over-
sight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 
172 (1984) (stating that the “fire alarm” approach to agency oversight taken by 
congressional committees advantages special-interest groups); Barry R. Wein-
gast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why 
Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 
151 (1988) (finding that members of congressional committees have special-
interest-group ratings statistically distinct from those of Congress as a whole). 
 25. See Rod Hague, The United States, in POWER AND POLICY IN LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACIES 95, 102 (Martin Harrop ed., 1992) (“Though nominally subordi-
nate to the President, the federal administration has permanent interests of 
its own.”). 
 2009] FLAWS OF UNBUNDLED EXECUTIVE 1701 
 
ers to bills, the ability to hold embarrassing and career-ending 
oversight hearings, and the ability in the Senate’s case to block 
a bureaucrat’s confirmation should he be promoted.26 The situ-
ation is even worse because while presidents are effectively 
term-limited to eight years, members of congressional commit-
tees can serve for as long as forty or fifty years. If rational bu-
reaucrats are given a choice between pleasing a President who 
is here today and gone tomorrow and pleasing a long-serving 
congressional committee member, they will always choose to 
please the committee member. 
The President’s only countervailing weapons in the fight 
for control over the bureaucracy are his possession of the execu-
tive power, which the theory of the unitary executive defends,27 
and his ability to reward loyalists by offering a promotion to a 
higher executive branch or judicial office. But even this presi-
dential carrot can only be deployed with the advice and consent 
of the Senate.28 The bottom line is that the congressional com-
mittees have more sway over the executive branch and the bu-
reaucracy than the President.  
This is a bad thing because members self-select what com-
mittees they serve on, subject to the constraints of the congres-
sional seniority system, which also exacerbates the capture 
problem.29 Thus, members of Congress from farm states tend to 
serve on the agriculture-related committees; members from fi-
nancial centers like New York serve on the Finance or Ways 
and Means Committees; and members from states like Massa-
chusetts and Utah, with a strong view on national Bill of 
Rights policy, tend to serve on the Judiciary Committees.30 Self 
selection, the seniority system, and the lack of term limits for 
service on a congressional committee make it really easy and 
 
 26. See JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND POLI-
CYMAKING 85–86 (1994) (analyzing the extent of congressional committee pow-
er). 
 27. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 1, at 579–81. 
 28. See Malcolm L. Cross, Washington, Hamilton, and the Establishment 
of the Dignified and Efficient Presidency, in GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 95, 102 (Mark J. Rozell et al. eds., 2000) (noting that 
the Constitution does not allow the President to appoint officials, but only to 
nominate them with the advice and consent of the Senate). 
 29. See THOMAS P. MURPHY, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
TEES 13 (1978). 
 30. See SCOTT A. FRISCH & SEAN Q. KELLY, COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT 
POLITICS IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 114 (2006) (“When district 
interests are narrow and the policy jurisdiction of the committee neatly maps 
onto those interests, members will be drawn to those committees.”). 
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likely that special interests will capture the committee chairs.31 
The presidency can be captured by special-interest groups too, 
but such capture is a lot more expensive and is harder to main-
tain over time. This is because the President has a national 
perspective while the congressional committee chairs and ma-
jorities have a parochial perspective.32 The President is respon-
sive only to a shifting national coalition of special interests that 
is large enough to keep his approval rating above fifty-one per-
cent. As a result, the existence of a unitary executive weakens 
factions and special-interest groups.  
Professor Jide Nzelibe has responded by claiming that 
presidents ought to be compared not with committee chairs but 
with the median member of Congress.33 Professor Nzelibe con-
tends that median members of Congress are actually more rep-
resentative of national majority opinion than is the President, 
and so we should empower median members of Congress more 
than we do the President.34 While Professor Nzelibe may be 
right when it comes to Congress’s role in lawmaking, he is sure-
ly wrong regarding Congress’s role in law execution.35 Congress 
is better at lawmaking than is the President,36 but it does not 
follow that Congress is also better at law execution. 
There are big differences in the way Congress undertakes 
lawmaking and the way in which it supervises, controls, and 
oversees law execution. Congress almost never holds floor votes 
where median members are decisive on questions of law execu-
tion. The congressional role in law execution is done almost en-
tirely through the committees and predominantly by the com-
 
 31. See Weingast & Marshall, supra note 24, at 149–51.  
 32. As previously noted by Professor Calabresi, the electorate has clearly 
demonstrated its understanding of the unparalleled importance of the Presi-
dent in our system—with voter turnout substantially higher in presidential 
elections than in midterm elections. Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, 
The President: Lightning Rod or King?, 115 YALE L.J. 2611, 2619 (2006). 
Twenty-first-century-Americans think and act as if the presidential choice is 
of central importance, but we doubt that more than a handful of voters know 
who is on the membership of the various oversight committees or how to lobby 
them. This greater public scrutiny ensures the President a more national 
perspective, which would be diluted by adding coexecutives. 
 33. Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial 
Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1221–23 (2006). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Professor Calabresi is currently working with Alejandro Aixala on a 
paper responding to Professor Nzelibe, which greatly elaborates on this point. 
 36. See Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 1, at 96. 
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mittee chairs.37 In asking who should control subordinate bu-
reaucrats as between the President and Congress, the tradeoff 
in reality is between presidentially accountable bureaucrats in 
the Office of Management and Budget and entrenched commit-
tee chairs and their aides, who are almost impervious to the 
opinions of the median member of Congress.38  
For a long time in the twentieth century, followers of the 
Progressive Movement believed that empowering independent 
experts represented a third way between unitary executivism 
and congressional committee government.39 Progressives devel-
oped and championed the establishment of independent regula-
tory commissions and later of independent agencies.40 They be-
lieved expert entities in government would truly do what was 
best for the citizenry and would not act at either the President’s 
or a congressional committee chair’s behest.41  
As we have learned more about the capture of independent 
regulatory commissions and as public choice scholarship has 
come to prevail,42 belief in “independent” government entities 
has come to seem like what Professor Nzelibe has called a “fa-
ble.”43 Today, we realize how easy it is for special-interest 
groups and factions to capture the so-called independent regu-
latory agencies just as it is easy for them to capture the over-
sight committees.44 The unitary executive is a backstop against 
 
 37. Some control by median members of Congress may occur in debates on 
appropriations bills and riders, but this is the exception, not the rule. Most of 
the control that Congress exercises over the bureaucracy is exercised by the 
committee chairs, not the median members. See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. 
Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policy-
making by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 790 (1983). 
 38. For a description of the constitutional origins of the congressional 
committees and the role of the Incompatibility Clause in creating them, see 
Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of 
Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1090 (1994). 
 39. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 421, 422–23 (1987). 
 40. See id. at 424, 429; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687 
(1988) (explaining that the Federal Trade Commission acts independently of 
executive control).  
 41. See Sunstein, supra note 39, at 422. 
 42. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENT-
ATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRA-
CY (1965); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 739 (1984). 
 43. Nzelibe, supra note 33, at 1260. 
 44. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 48–49 
(2007). 
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such capture because it is more expensive and harder to cap-
ture and maintain control over the presidency than it is to cap-
ture a small commission or congressional committee.45 Berry 
and Gersen’s system would tend toward governance by unac-
countable congressional committees, and that would be a bad 
thing. 
 
 45. Two more points about the current debate over the unitary executive 
bear mentioning in light of Professor Kitrosser’s paper for this panel. See Hei-
di Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741 (2009). First, 
Congress seems to have delegated a lot of broad rule-making power that is al-
most lawmaking power to executive branch subordinates. Kitrosser worries 
rightly about the unitary executive in this context. Id. at 1761–69. We think 
some of the delegations Congress has made run afoul of the nondelegation doc-
trine and ought to be struck down by the courts on that ground. The courts 
should force Congress to make decisions and not pass the buck to executive 
entities, which it then tries to control through the back door via the committee 
chairs. When Congress does this, it effectually delegates power to its own 
members—the committee chairs—which is highly problematic on separation of 
powers grounds. Right now, Congress has an incentive to delegate broad pow-
er to nominally executive branch or independent agencies which it can then 
control behind the scenes. 
Under the theory of the unitary executive, Congress would lose its current 
incentive to delegate and would acquire an incentive to write laws more pre-
cisely so the courts could hold the unitary executive to the words of statutes. It 
is fair to say the theory of the unitary executive would create a better incen-
tive structure for Congress than does the current constitutional structure. 
Second, Professor Kitrosser makes much of the fact that the unitary ex-
ecutive is built on the idea that the President can act secretly, and thus ener-
getically, and that this secrecy undermines unitarian claims to foster accoun-
tability. Id. at 1741–42. This is a fair point, and we do not have or purport to 
have a theory of how far secrecy in the form of executive privilege or otherwise 
ought to prevail. It is simply a question we have not yet worked through. It 
may well be the case, as Kitrosser argues, that we should have a lot less secre-
cy and a lot more transparency in the executive branch than we have had un-
der President George W. Bush. Id. at 1743–45. We do not claim to have a posi-
tion on that question, and as originalist interpreters of the Constitution, we 
are not at all sure of the constitutional foundations for any claims of executive 
privilege. It is arguable that the explicit provision of a Speech and Debate 
Clause, providing protection and sometimes secrecy for congressional delibera-
tions, implies that the absence of a similar executive privilege clause in Article 
II is telling. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6. 
One should not think that to the extent secrecy in government is a con-
cern, there is almost total secrecy about the communications made in the over-
sight process from the committee chairs and their staffs to the bureaucracy. It 
is at least as important that those communications be on the record and public 
as that communications from the Office of Management and Budget be public 
and on the record. All those who denounce the unitary executive for being se-
cretive might want to look at the veil of total secrecy in which congressional 
committee communications to the bureaucracy are made. 
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B.  RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND THE COST OF OBTAINING 
INFORMATION 
A second flaw with Berry and Gersen’s proposal for nation-
ally elected plural executives is that it overlooks rational ignor-
ance and the cost of obtaining information. Information is ex-
pensive to obtain in both time and money, and the Berry and 
Gersen proposal would reduce the amount of voter information 
by raising the costs of gathering information and by lowering 
the value of the information gathered. Under the Berry-Gersen 
proposal, voters would face more choices and so they would, of 
necessity, be less informed on each and all of them. Voters have 
a finite amount of time to invest in learning about candidates 
for executive office, and if they must learn about three candi-
dates instead of one, they will learn less than one-third as 
much about each of the three. 
Nothing is free. Even information must be acquired 
through the expenditure of scarce resources, particularly time 
and effort.46 Once the marginal cost of acquiring additional in-
formation becomes greater than its marginal value, the voter 
has no incentive to learn more.47 This simple concept is typical-
ly termed “rational ignorance” because the voter makes a ra-
tional decision to remain ignorant of the additional informa-
tion.48  
Two big factors cause voters to exhibit high degrees of ra-
tional ignorance: the high cost of acquiring reliable informa-
tion49 and the low value of such information.50 First, the cost of 
acquiring reliable information about a candidate for office is 
high because candidates are expert in presenting only favorable 
information and have every incentive to skate the edges of the 
truth.51 Second, the value of even reliable information to the 
voter is exceptionally low.52 In fact, the mere act of voting is far 
more costly in time and energy spent than is the expected value 
of the vote in presidential elections,53 which is why we see low 
 
 46. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 265 (1957) 
(“[T]ime is the principal cost of voting: time to register, to discover what par-
ties are running, to deliberate, to go to the polls, and to mark the ballot.”). 
 47. Id. at 266. 
 48. ANDREW HINDMOOR, RATIONAL CHOICE 170 (2006). 
 49. See DOWNS, supra note 46, at 218. 
 50. Id. at 244, 265. 
 51. Id. at 226–27, 262. 
 52. Id. at 258–59, 265–66. 
 53. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 305 (2003) (“Several 
people have noted that the probability of being run over by a car going to or 
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observed voter turnout in presidential and other elections.54 
Since a voter’s vote itself is of so little value, the gathering of 
information that might influence a voter’s vote is a costly and 
unlikely endeavor.55 As a result, voters use proxies like the la-
bels “Democrat” or “Republican” to give them a very rough 
sense of where the candidates stand on the issues.56 
The Berry-Gersen coexecutive proposal would reduce the 
amount of voter information from both ends by increasing the 
cost of gathering information and reducing the value of such in-
formation. First, Berry and Gersen increase the cost of gather-
ing information on both position issues and valence issues.57 
Position issues involve the policy positions taken by a candi-
date.58 Valence characteristics involve the personal characteris-
tics of the candidates—whether candidates are honest, energet-
ic, or decisive.59 
The cost of gathering information on position issues under 
a (perfectly) unbundled system would not necessarily be a lot 
higher than under a bundled unitary executive system. The 
voter would face the same costs in gathering information on 
policy positions if there were two candidates for one office or six 
candidates for three executive offices. But the cost of informa-
tion would rapidly increase as overlap among the powers of the 
coexecutives grows, as it inevitably would in the real world.60 
 
returning from the polls is similar to the probability of casting the decisive 
vote.”). 
 54. See DOWNS, supra note 46, at 260. 
 55. Thus, the low value of votes and the high cost of getting accurate in-
formation about candidates lead to high levels of voter ignorance. This is offset 
to some extent by the entertainment value some voters receive by following 
politics or watching debates, but relatively few Americans invest much time in 
really learning about candidates for public office because it would not be ra-
tional for them to do so. See id. at 274. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Donald E. Stokes, Spatial Models of Party Competition, 57 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 368, 373 (1963) (describing position issues and valence issues). 
 58. Id. 
 59. MUELLER, supra note 53, at 240. 
 60. If the policy dimensions of coexecutives are perfectly distinct among 
the, say, three coexecutives, the additional information costs of the coexecutive 
structure over the unitary executive structure are trivial. But, if the three 
coexecutives each possess the whole of the executive power as in an executive 
council, the information costs of learning about policy positions of candidates 
would be a multiple of the presidential system costs. Thus, if there were seven 
members of an executive council, for example, all with an equal policy dimen-
sion, the costs of gathering information about policy positions for any equiva-
lent level of information would be roughly seven times those incurred in elect-
ing just one executive. The additional cost of gathering information about 
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The cost of gathering information on valence issues is quite 
another story since the personal qualities of the candidates for 
executive office are independent of the bundling or unbundling 
of policy dimensions. The costs of gathering personal informa-
tion about the candidates for executive office will necessarily 
always increase in proportion as the number of candidates in-
creases.61 Overall, then, the cost of gathering information will 
be higher with coexecutives than with a unitary executive. 
Consider now the value of the acquired information to the 
voter. Each unit of information gathered has less value to the 
voter under a coexecutive structure as compared to a unitary 
executive structure. The value of information to the voter is the 
product of: first, its influence on his vote;62 second, the expected 
value of his vote on the election;63 and third, the difference in 
his personal valuation of the candidates and assessment of the 
benefit he expects to receive if his preferred candidate wins.64 
First, in elections for a plural executive of co-presidents, 
the likelihood that additional policy position information will 
influence a voter’s vote should be higher than in a presidential 
election for a unitary executive. This is because fewer issues 
are bundled together in one vote, so an unbundled vote will be 
more likely to be affected by additional information than a 
bundled vote. The likelihood that additional valence-issue in-
formation pertaining to the character and ability of the candi-
date will influence a voter’s vote in a Berry-Gersen system of 
coexecutives should go down, however, because the power of the 
 
policy positions in any real-world coexecutive system would thus depend criti-
cally on how airtight the division of authority turns out in reality among the 
various coexecutives. 
 61. The cost of forming an opinion on the character and abilities of four 
candidates is thus approximately double the cost of similarly evaluating two. 
Alternatively, a voter could, and probably would, spend the same amount of 
time and effort judging four candidates half as well as judging two candidates. 
 62. If more information is likely to have little influence on a voter’s vote, it 
naturally has little value to him. A dyed-in-the-wool partisan gets no value 
from candidate information in the general election because it will not change 
his vote. See DOWNS, supra note 46, at 243. 
 63. MUELLER, supra note 53, at 305. Similarly, the value of information to 
a voter goes up as the probability increases that the voter in question can have 
an effect on the outcome of the election. In national elections, the probability 
that any given individual voter will decide the election is staggeringly low be-
cause of the millions of votes cast. Id. 
 64. Id. at 240–41. To this might be added, as we mentioned above, the en-
tertainment value that comes from knowing more about current events or 
watching campaign speeches, debates, and commercials, which will be unaf-
fected by the structure of the executive branch. 
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winning candidate will be less than in our unitary executive 
system.65  
Second, the expected value to voters of information, which 
is the probability of its being decisive in whether or not a can-
didate wins, is unlikely to change at all based on the number of 
executive officials elected. Assuming that each election has ap-
proximately the same number of votes cast, the probability of 
any individual vote being decisive is equivalent. There is no 
reason to expect politicians to be better able to run close races 
when the policy dimensions are reduced.66  
Third, what about the value of information to the voter? By 
dividing the executive power into several parts, the unbundled 
executive proposal would reduce the value to the voter of any 
given candidate winning an election.67 Unlike the presidential 
system, the coexecutive system vests only a portion of the ex-
ecutive power in each official.68 When the preferred candidate 
of a voter wins a coexecutive election, the value to the voter is 
thus limited to the value of winning on the policy within the 
control of the respective co-president.69  
 
 65. Stokes, supra note 57, at 373 (noting the tendency of political analysis 
to attempt rationalization of valence-issue effects as position-issue effects). A 
reduction in value of character information might even be said to be an advan-
tage of the Berry-Gersen unbundled executive, as voters substitute relatively 
higher-value position-issue information for character-issue information. 
 66. Id. (discussing the importance of valence issues in presidential elec-
tions); see also WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 239–41 
(1988) (examining historical election results to show that adding or shifting 
salient policy dimensions simply results in a change in the winning party). 
 67. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 68. Berry & Gersen, supra note 6, at 1404. 
 69. First, assume as Berry and Gersen do that the policy dimensions are 
distinct with no overlap of authority between coexecutives. See id. at 1409. 
Each election deals with distinct policy issues. If this is the case, the candi-
dates are competing in an environment where only one policy choice is at 
stake. The Hotelling-Downs model of candidate competition suggests that in 
such situations, both candidates will move toward the median voter. MUEL-
LER, supra note 53, at 231–32. As the positions of the candidates become more 
alike, the expected value to the voter of either candidate winning the election 
goes down because the differences between their platforms are less striking. 
The election becomes a choice between Tweedle Dum and Tweedle Dee. There-
fore, the expected value of information about that election to the voter will be 
far lower than it would be with two candidates competing across all policy is-
sues in a unitary executive presidential election because there will be virtually 
no difference between the coexecutive candidates.  
Second, assume the policy dimensions do overlap to some degree. In that 
case, the candidates will be offering policy positions in multiple dimensions 
that may conflict with the policy positions of other coexecutives. Even the vic-
torious candidate cannot guarantee a policy will be enacted, as it will depend 
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The value of acquired information to the voter, then, de-
pends on three factors: the likelihood of information changing 
the voter’s vote, which goes up with unbundling for position in-
formation but not for valence information; the probability of the 
vote being decisive, which stays the same; and the value to the 
voter of his preferred candidate winning an election, which goes 
down. Which effect will dominate? While the answer in the ab-
stract and hypothetical world of Berry and Gersen may be un-
clear, our observation of coexecutives at the state level indi-
cates that the value to the voter of information would almost 
certainly go down where there are elections of plural coexecu-
tives. 
Consider three statewide offices: governor, attorney gener-
al, and comptroller. Gubernatorial elections are focal points in 
state elections; they receive more attention and result in more 
spending than elections for the offices of attorney general and 
comptroller.70 This is because these three coexecutive offices 
are not equal in power and prestige. Voters focus on the elec-
tions where the most power is at stake or where the candidates’ 
positions differ the most because it is the outcome of those elec-
tions that will most affect voters.71 For these reasons, we can 
safely say that the value of acquired information to the voter 
will be lower overall in a Berry-Gersen style unbundled coex-
ecutive system than with a bundled unitary executive. 
Voters in a Berry-Gersen world of unbundled coexecutives 
then would face both: (1) higher costs in gathering information; 
and (2) lower value from the information they have gathered. 
Voters would respond by spending less time and effort in ga-
thering information. This would be particularly true with re-
spect to character-issue information, which inheres in the indi-
vidual candidate. As the number of candidates grows and the 
power of each shrinks, voters would have every incentive to cut 
back on the amount of information they gather on each candi-
 
upon the results of other elections. This is a version of the stalemate that often 
occurs between the President and Congress. The net result is a lower value to 
the voter of his preferred candidate winning any particular coexecutive elec-
tion, both in absolute terms and relative to the coexecutive’s share of executive 
power. 
 70. See, e.g., Rick Pearson & Ray Gibson, Blagojevich, Ryan Spent Record 
Sum, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2003, § 2, at 1 (explaining how the winning guberna-
torial candidate spent more than twice as much as the winning candidate for 
attorney general). 
 71. See MARY MARGARET CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 123–34 (1985). 
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date and overall. Since the electoral check on executive power 
works by monitoring and voting, accountability would end up 
being undermined by moving from a unitary to a plural execu-
tive system. A voter who knows a little about many officials is 
not as well positioned to hold any or all of them accountable as 
a voter who knows much about just one. 
This theory is borne out by voter behavior at the state level 
where voters appear to invest little energy in many separate 
elections beyond the gubernatorial election. This is because—
contrary to what Berry and Gersen may think72—the form of 
unbundling in the states is not properly described as a coexecu-
tive system. Rather than opting for weak governors coequal to 
the other executive officers, forty-four of the states have instead 
given their governors a line-item veto, which makes those ex-
ecutive officers stronger relative to the state legislature than 
the President is to Congress.73 Separate election of coexecutives 
in the states has a long history with roots in the populism of 
the Jacksonians.74 Not everyone has agreed over the course of 
American history with this populism, and indeed, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Progressives, led 
in part by Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, helped to 
give rise to a short ballot movement in the states.75 Advocates 
of a short ballot thought that long ballots for scores of officials 
led voters not to want to learn anything about most of the can-
didates for office, thus reducing accountability and energy.76 
Ironically, the advocates of a short ballot pointed to the federal 
unitary executive as a model in arguing against unbundled 
coexecutives in the states.77 Rational ignorance, the cost of ga-
thering information, and the small likelihood that one’s vote for 
 
 72. Berry & Gersen, supra note 6, at 1399. 
 73. See Liu, supra note 5, at 21–22. The remaining states are Indiana, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
 74. See Richard S. Childs, Politics Without Politicians, in SHORT BALLOT 
11, 12–13 (Edna D. Bullock ed., 1915); William P. Marshall, Break Up the 
Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided 
Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2452 (2006). Unbundling in the states was part 
of a larger trend toward populism and against elitism in government. See Ste-
phen C. Erickson, The Entrenching of Incumbency: Reelections in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, 1790–1994, 14 CATO J. 397, 404–06 (1995). 
 75. THE NAT’L SHORT BALLOT ORG., THE SHORT BALLOT: A MOVEMENT TO 
SIMPLIFY POLITICS 1–7, 29 (1916); Short Ballot—What It Is—Its Progress to 
Date, in SHORT BALLOT, supra note 74, at 54, 61. 
 76. The Short Ballot Principle, KY. L.J., Apr. 1913, at 16, 16. 
 77. RICHARD S. CHILDS, SHORT-BALLOT PRINCIPLES 115–16 (1911). See 
generally Liu, supra note 5. 
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any office in a system of separated powers will make a differ-
ence all suggest that multiplying the number of executive offic-
es is a bad idea.78 
This is especially the case because Berry and Gersen are 
arguing for a plural over a unitary executive in a separation of 
powers system where we already have a separate ballot for 
elections to the Senate and the House of Representatives. 
Moreover, because this is a federal system, there are separate 
ballots beyond the ones in federal elections for state governors, 
attorneys general, comptrollers, and for state senates and 
houses of representatives. The American voter already has a 
dizzyingly large number of offices to vote for. This is a hard-
wired feature of having a separation of powers federal system 
instead of a British parliamentary system. To that vast array of 
choices, Berry and Gersen would now add the confusion of addi-
tional choices for unbundled coexecutives. 
American voters already respond to a system characterized 
by the separation of powers, federalism, and the fact that any 
one election victory counts for less, with some of the lowest vot-
er turnout rates in the industrial democratic world. This is ra-
tional behavior. In a system of checks and balances, the costs of 
gathering information on all the candidates in an election are 
outweighed by the negligible ability of election victors to im-
plement their election promises once they win office. These 
costs of the separation of powers are in our view more than off-
set by the value of the amount of unbundling that the Madiso-
nian system gives us.79 But even Berry and Gersen concede 
that at some point too much unbundling is unwise as a matter 
of cost-benefit analysis.80 We think the American polity is close 
 
 78. The same point applies to Professor Kitrosser’s endorsement of inde-
pendent regulatory agencies subject to congressional committee oversight. See 
Kitrosser, supra note 45, at 1752–54. The public has no clue what these agen-
cies are, what their jurisdiction is, who sits on the commissions that run them, 
or which members of Congress provide oversight through which congressional 
committees. Professor Kitrosser argues that “accountability is best furthered 
not by occasional, winner-take-all elections, but by the complex chains of au-
thority and expertise that characterize bureaucracies.” Id. at 1750. We disag-
ree, given that in reality, the complex chain is being pulled by a congressional 
committee chair who is accountable only to the voters of one congressional dis-
trict out of 435 or to the voters of just one state. 
 79. See Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government, supra note 1, 
at 58–59 (highlighting the ways in which unbundled electoral choice at the 
district, state, and national level empowers voters to express nuanced policy 
preferences). 
 80. See Berry & Gersen, supra note 6, at 1387 (noting the costs associated 
with unbundling). 
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to that point now. Adding even more unbundling to the U.S. 
system, as Berry and Gersen propose, would lead to even lower 
voter turnout and higher levels of voter dissatisfaction because 
rational voters will opt for ignorance over a flood of additional 
information that is of low value to them. 
C.  ACCOUNTABILITY 
Third, a plural executive will actually reduce accountabili-
ty (the opposite of what Berry and Gersen predict) not only in 
the hypothetical world Berry and Gersen have created, but 
even more so in our own real world. This is because, as Alexan-
der Hamilton argued so long ago in the Federalist Papers, 
coexecutives will have powerful incentives to blur accountabili-
ty by blurring the distinctions between their own power and 
the power of their coexecutive colleagues. Thus, even if power 
could be neatly and accurately apportioned in advance among 
coexecutive officials, it would not remain so apportioned over 
time. Each coexecutive would have powerful incentives to blur 
accountability so that he could claim credit for policy successes 
and avoid blame for policy failures. As Alexander Hamilton 
said, a plural executive will “conceal faults and destroy respon-
sibility.”81 
The reason for this is that accountability depends on in-
formation.82 Before voters can hold an official responsible for 
his actions in office, they must learn what actions he has taken 
or failed to take. When voters have less information, they are 
less able to hold officials accountable. The unbundling of the 
executive will not only reduce the amount of information voters 
have on each coexecutive, as discussed above, but it will also 
reduce accountability. In order for voters to be able to hold 
coexecutives accountable for what they do in particular policy 
dimensions, the voters must first learn what the officials in 
question have done.83 Yet the average voter will be less in-
formed in an unbundled system with respect to each election 
and to all elections as a whole. As a result of higher information 
costs and lower value of information acquired, the information 
the average voter has about any one of three coexecutives will 
 
 81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 395. 
 82. See id. (noting that public accountability depends on the ability of vot-
ers to easily and clearly discover political misconduct). 
 83. Berry & Gersen, supra note 6, at 1403 (acknowledging the need for 
clarity as to which officials are responsible for particular policies). 
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be less than one-third of the information the voter would have 
about a President.  
The reduced information each voter would have about 
coexecutives might be offset by the greater ease with which 
voters can hold coexecutives accountable for actions in specific 
policy dimensions. If you do not like the way the economy is be-
ing handled, being able to blame one coexecutive for economic 
policy might seem to enhance accountability as Berry and Ger-
sen claim. But for this to have any chance of working, the policy 
dimensions must remain sharp and distinct. In fact, however, 
the coexecutives would have every incentive to blur the boun-
daries of their power to escape accountability, and they would 
succeed in doing so. 
It has long been recognized that division of power leads to 
a diffusion of responsibility.84 Executive councils veil responsi-
bility in the same way legislative bodies do. Since every action 
must be approved by too many actors to make the vote of any 
one actor decisive, a particular official can rarely be held to an-
swer for the actions of the group. This is why although Con-
gress as an institution enjoys a dismal approval rating, indi-
vidual members are usually quite popular in their states or 
districts. Berry and Gersen’s coexecutive system deftly avoids 
the defect of a division of power leading to a diffusion of respon-
sibility by assigning power to coexecutives for distinct policy 
dimensions.85 Power is not shared among the foreign, economic, 
and social policy co-presidents, so each is fully accountable for 
successes or failures in his own area.  
The problem is that even if such a partition could ever be 
effected initially, it is abundantly clear it would not last. At 
every opportunity, each coexecutive would have strong incen-
tives to blur the distinctions between his own power and that of 
the other coexecutives. There are two reasons for this: the ex-
pansion of power and the ability to shift and insure against 
blame. 
Coexecutives will have an incentive to try to expand the 
scope of their power as much as possible. Aside from any psy-
chological utility derived from feeling more powerful, increased 
power and rents provide direct benefits in politics. Expanded 
 
 84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 395–
98. 
 85. See Berry & Gersen, supra note 6, at 1406 (suggesting a scenario 
wherein the electorate could vote to remove a Secretary of Defense from office 
without voting out the President). 
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power leads to more patronage. The more workers or funds a 
coexecutive controls, the more he can deploy those resources to 
improve his image and increase his chances of reelection.86 A 
second benefit of power is the ability to use it to extract support 
or rents from interested groups.87 Special-interest groups will 
spend more time and resources courting coexecutives in their 
area of policy interest since those coexecutives will have more 
power to implement the special interest’s preferred policies.88 A 
third advantage of power in politics is prominence. Prominence 
allows the coexecutive to offer endorsements and claim a posi-
tion of leadership within his party.89 It also enhances the value 
of opportunities for the candidate on leaving office, such as 
speaking honoraria, managerial positions of various organiza-
tions, or book deals.90 Finally, more power in politics is helpful 
in implementing policies about which a coexecutive may have 
strong preferences. Some politicians desire power as a means to 
self-advancement, but some also derive value from seeing their 
favored policies implemented.91  
In short, politicians have many reasons to seek more pow-
er. In trying to expand their power, coexecutives may encroach 
on each other or lay claim to powers not expressly provided for 
in the original partition. Either outcome will blur the bounda-
 
 86. See Kenneth N. Bickers & Robert M. Stein, The Electoral Dynamics of 
the Federal Pork Barrel, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1300, 1323 (1996) (concluding that 
the provision of benefits increases chances of reelection to Congress); Erickson, 
supra note 74, at 412 (discussing the advantage of resources for congressional 
incumbents). 
 87. Fred S. McChesney, Rent Seeking and Rent Extraction, in THE ELGAR 
COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE 382–86 (William F. Shughart II & Laura Raz-
zolini eds., 2001) (noting the use of “milker bills,” which are submitted for the 
sole purpose of “milking” payments from interest groups).  
 88. Unlike the patronage advantage, in which coexecutives must compete 
against each other, the special-interest advantage benefits all coexecutives. 
Once a special interest has invested in securing some benefit, it falls into a 
trap from which it cannot escape. A second coexecutive can extract much of 
the remaining value to the special-interest group by threatening to block the 
policy. This is essentially the transitional gains trap argument developed by 
Gordon Tullock. See Gordon Tullock, The Transitional Gains Trap, 6 BELL J. 
ECON. 671 (1975). 
 89. See Nzelibe, supra note 33, at 1242–43 (noting the incentives for poli-
ticians to exploit political capital in the private sphere). 
 90. See Timothy Groseclose & Keith Krehbiel, Golden Parachutes, Rubber 
Checks, and Strategic Retirements from the 102d House, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 75, 
94–95 (1994) (finding that financial incentives had a strong effect on retire-
ment decisions of politicians); Nzelibe, supra note 33, at 1242–43. 
 91. See MELVIN J. HINICH & MICHAEL C. MUNGER, ANALYTICAL POLITICS 
127–28 (1997). 
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ries of coexecutive power, even if the executive power had been 
perfectly partitioned at the start. A perfect apportionment of 
executive power is itself highly unlikely because just as con-
tracts cannot be perfectly clear in all their terms, constitutions 
must be broadly framed, so an airtight division of power among 
coexecutives at the start is itself utterly implausible.92 Those 
who disagree need only ask themselves how airtight the Fra-
mers’ divisions of legislative, executive, and judicial power 
turned out to be in the Constitution of 1787.93 
But there is yet another reason to think coexecutives will 
blur the boundaries of their power. No matter how sharp and 
clear the original partition of executive power, coexecutives can 
avoid and insure against accountability and blame by blurring 
the boundaries of power. This is possible because such blurring 
helps all the coexecutives involved. While the blurring may step 
on the domain of one coexecutive, a reciprocal incursion into 
the domain of the second coexecutive could be collusively 
agreed upon. Even if the net result is less power for the coex-
ecutive, the ability to shift or insure against blame could easily 
compensate for the loss. This is particularly true where the 
boundary blurred involves issues particularly nettlesome to the 
coexecutive. If a politician had the opportunity to share control 
of a potentially contentious issue, like the decision whether or 
not to invade Iraq, he would be a fool to refuse. Partial control 
allows the politician to take credit for the successes, while dis-
owning and spreading the risks that go with the failures. Each 
coexecutive could plausibly claim the other had prevented suc-
cessful policy implementation, and claim that his own actions 
were instrumental in whatever success was achieved.94 The 
voters could not separate truth from falsehood without a large 
investment in information, which as discussed above, is likely 
not worth the return.95 
 
 92. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2 (dis-
cussing the inherency of the powers expressly stated in the Necessary and 
Proper Clause); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Go-
vernance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 237 (1979) (noting 
that transaction costs limit the degree to which contracts can be fully speci-
fied). 
 93. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–39 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 94. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 
396 (“It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on 
whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of per-
nicious measures, ought really to fall.”). 
 95. Id. (“And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the 
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This, of course, is exactly why the Framers rejected an ex-
ecutive council.96 It conceals responsibility and fault. In fact, a 
public record of votes in an executive council might actually be 
better than the Berry and Gersen coexecutive system. The Ber-
ry and Gersen system makes possible the shifting of blame for 
policy decisions without there being any public record of votes 
in executive council deliberations. Without knowing which 
coexecutive to blame, the voters would have to punish all or 
none of them. Even an engaged electorate would be unable to 
hold coexecutives accountable in this situation. Hamilton’s 
warning about the ability of plural executives “to conceal faults, 
and destroy responsibility” rings no less true for Berry and 
Gersen’s plural executive than it does for traditional executive 
councils.97  
 
odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction?”). 
 96. Id. at 398.  
 97. Id. at 395. Professor Kitrosser raises a provocative challenge to the 
unitary executive by arguing that it would lead to less accountability than 
does the current system with its headless fourth branch. See Kitrosser, supra 
note 45, at 1743–44. She rightly points out that the Bush administration in-
voked executive privilege so often that it was impossible to hold it fully ac-
countable for its actions. See id. at 1764–68. Secrecy, she argues, destroys the 
whole argument that a unitary executive will be a more accountable executive. 
See id. at 1742–43.  
We substantially agree with this and would add that the doctrine of ex-
ecutive privilege is not spelled out in the Constitution and must be derived as 
a matter of structural inference. We would recognize executive privilege in 
core contexts where foreign policy and orders to the military are at issue. We 
would also recognize a privilege of prosecutors to keep information they have 
gathered secret. We would not, however, recognize a claim of privilege by for-
mer President Bush or former Attorney General Gonzales that would immun-
ize them from answering the question: “Did you fire a U.S. Attorney for the 
purpose of helping Republicans win elections?” To that extent, we agree with 
Kitrosser. We should add that we see no reason why secrecy was needed when 
the White House intervened with the EPA to deny California’s fuel mileage 
standards or with NASA over scientific research on global warming. The prop-
er test for a claim of executive privilege ought to be the Morrison v. Olson test 
of whether Congress went too far in restricting effective presidential control. 
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–94 (1988). That test is woefully 
wrong in the removal context where the President clearly has the removal 
power, but balancing is necessary and proper with a judge-created, implied 
structural doctrine like executive privilege. 
At times, Kitrosser suggests that accountability requires not only trans-
parency, with which we agree, but also procedural regularity. See Kitrosser, 
supra note 45, at 1755–57. This point may often be right as well, especially as 
to presidential directives and executive orders. However, we would have to 
hear more about the specific procedures Kitrosser would require to know if we 
would agree with her. In general, the critical point is that the President must 
be able to fire any subordinate without further process for a policy disagree-
ment.  
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D.  COORDINATION 
Fourth, Berry and Gersen’s proposed system of coexecu-
tives is a bad idea because it would lead to higher coordination 
costs. Separately electing coexecutives for separate policy areas 
creates costs and incentives that hinder coordinated action. 
This is a big problem in the executive branch because it is that 
branch which must enforce the laws, conduct foreign relations, 
and provide for the national defense.98 Coordination is essential 
to efficiency and energy in the executive. Without coordination, 
coexecutive policies may run at cross purposes, leading to 
waste, increases in taxes, and a decrease in services. 
Failures of this kind are especially likely where coexecu-
tives are all elected, which suggests that the successes of the 
current independent agencies99 ought not to be very reassuring 
for us. A nationally elected Federal Reserve Board, for example, 
might well choose to manipulate interest rates to enhance its 
own reelection chances, and other currently independent enti-
ties might act similarly if their heads were nationally elected.  
One person rarely has difficulty sharing information with 
himself. As the number of coexecutives increases, however, the 
cost of providing and receiving such information rises exponen-
tially.100 This reflects the additional time and effort required to 
exchange information among all of the concerned parties. In a 
unitary-executive presidential system, information flows to the 
President from the cabinet in a fairly efficient manner. Without 
this central point in the network of information, however, each 
coexecutive must coordinate directly with all the other coexecu-
tives. This is highly inefficient for two primary reasons: infor-
mation costs and bargaining costs.  
The rise in information costs created by a Berry-Gersen 
plural executive is a product of its structure as a diffuse point-
to-point network, rather than a centralized hub-and-spoke 
network. Information is more easily collected and distributed 
when it travels through the President than when it must pass 
 
 98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 391–
92. 
 99. See generally Marshall J. Berger & Gary J. Edles, Established by 
Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 1111 (2000). 
 100. If each coexecutive must directly gather information from every other 
coexecutive, there will be a substantive rise in information costs, creating inef-
ficiency. See infra, note 101.  
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directly from each coexecutive to every other coexecutive.101 
These information costs alone discourage coordination at the 
outset. The incentives of coexecutives to withhold information 
in order to get a more favorable agreement may increase the in-
formation costs even more.102  
The second major cost of coordination imposed by a coex-
ecutive structure is the increased cost of bargaining that will 
have to go on among coexecutives. Such costs are exclusively a 
feature of the Berry and Gersen coexecutive model because 
there are no such costs to having a unitary executive. A unitary 
executive simply gets information and policy proposals from 
appointees, and he decides on a course of action. Berry and 
Gersen’s coexecutives, however, cannot force changes in policies 
outside their own jurisdictions, so they must bargain to some 
agreement. The cost of such bargaining will vary greatly de-
pending on the issues involved and the degree of ideological 
agreement among the coexecutives. Bargaining will generally 
be expensive because of the divergent interests of the parties 
and the incentives to selectively withhold information.103 
Why not simply elect a coordination executive? Such an ex-
ecutive would either: (1) have the power to force coordination; 
or (2) rely on persuasion and information to get his way. First, 
it is obvious that an executive with the power to force coordina-
tion would be simply a President by another name. The quasi-
president would have the power to control the affairs of state, 
but with a cabinet comprised of independently elected secreta-
ries hobbling the administration. Such an arrangement would 
be a special disaster as it would have all the costs of both sys-
tems. On the other hand, if the coordination coexecutive is de-
pendent on persuasion alone to get his way, he has no real 
power, so adding a coordination executive adds nothing but the 
cost of an additional layer of bureaucracy.104  
 
 101. Mathematically, if there are N cabinet secretaries, the total number of 
information exchanges in a presidential system is N. In an unbundled system, 
there are N(N-1)/2, which is simply the finite summation over k=1…N of (k-1), 
which represents the situation where every coexecutive directly deals with 
every other coexecutive. 
 102. See John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private Informa-
tion, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45 (1993) (discussing the various costs of bar-
gaining with private information). 
 103. See id. 
 104. The persuasive efforts of the coordination coexecutive would merely 
add an extra step to the bargaining system described above. In the case of a 
coordination coexecutive, that person’s task would be to convince other coex-
ecutives to act against the narrow interests they were elected to advance. The 
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Even if coexecutives could coordinate without any addi-
tional transaction costs, strong incentives would encourage 
them to compete rather than cooperate. The limited scope of 
the policy dimension of each coexecutive would give that person 
a narrow focus on policy results falling particularly in his bai-
liwick. The impact one coexecutive’s policies would have on the 
policies of another coexecutive would be of no direct concern. In 
theory, the coexecutives could of course bargain around such 
harmful results, but there would be substantial costs to doing 
so. If such bargaining failed, each coexecutive would choose a 
policy that maximized his policy goals, even as his coexecutive 
colleagues did the same. 
This is a classic case of a choice with reasonably well-
known payoffs and without coordination between the parties—
an ideal situation to analyze with a simple game-theoretic 
model. In fact, this situation matches fairly closely the famous 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.105 Imagine that given any policy choice by 
the second coexecutive, the first coexecutive would always be 
better off choosing his favored policy. Imagine the same is true 
for the second coexecutive, given any policy choice of the first 
coexecutive. Now, imagine that they would both be better off if 
both chose their less-preferred accommodating strategy than if 
both chose their most-preferred strategy. In other words, im-
agine a situation where coordinated action is better for all the 
coexecutives than is uncoordinated action. Of course, the best 
possible outcome for each coexecutive is not coordinating while 
the other does coordinate because that gives all the benefits of 
the other party’s accommodation without any of the costs of re-
ciprocation. In such a situation, each coexecutive has an incen-
tive to choose a selfish strategy, regardless of what the other 
coexecutives do. Hence the dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma 
problem can be solved by repeated interaction, but there is a 
 
trade coexecutive thus might be asked by the coordination coexecutive to im-
plement a trade policy that substantially benefits the environmental coexecu-
tive, but which is not optimal from a trade perspective. It is unclear in such a 
case which policy even a true statesman should implement. Either the policy 
will be inefficient for the nation, or the coexecutive must act contrary to the 
very reason for which he was elected. In short, a coordination coexecutive with 
only persuasive powers would be like a host nation for international treaty ne-
gotiations. The time and energy involved would be a terrible drain on govern-
ment efficiency, yet it would still not reach the same level of coordination as 
that currently enjoyed under a bundled executive system.  
 105. See Omar Azfar, The Logic of Collective Action, in THE ELGAR COMPA-
NION TO PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 87, at 59, 67.  
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cost to those solutions.106 Additionally, the game will be subject 
to end-period unraveling as coexecutives anticipate the ends of 
their terms and of their coexecutives’ terms as an election year 
approaches.107  
The above argument can likewise be explained as follows: 
coexecutives will not find it possible to coordinate on all issues 
because bargaining has costs. When they cannot coordinate, 
each coexecutive will follow the policies that maximize his own 
chance of reelection. These policies may have secondary effects 
in other policy dimensions that hinder policies already in place 
in those dimensions. If all coexecutives are so behaving, they 
may all be acting rationally given their narrow personal inter-
ests, but their actions will nonetheless reduce the efficiency of 
the entire system of government.108 As a result, there will be 
waste, higher taxes, and a decrease in services provided. Coex-
ecutives might, and indeed often would rationally choose poli-
cies that are inefficient.109 They have incentives not to coordi-
nate. 
Suppose further that some politicians are occasionally mo-
tivated by partisanship and other such base goals. Is it not 
possible to imagine that in such cases, coexecutives might even 
pursue policies that selectively harm the political reputations of 
their coexecutive colleagues? Such partisan coexecutives might 
for example engage in “turf wars” over policy dimensions where 
the jurisdiction of the coexecutives was sufficiently unclear. 
While turf wars are hardly unknown even under our current 
unitary executive system,110 such infighting under the unitary 
executive is limited by the willingness of the President to tole-
rate division and infighting. In a Berry-Gersen system of coex-
ecutives, the top dog in every chain of command would have 
every incentive to engage in infighting or to fight turf wars. 
Beyond the problem of turf wars, the coexecutive system 
raises the possibility of the threat of outright sabotage. One 
could imagine that coexecutives might well have both the op-
portunity and the incentive on some occasions to implement a 
policy specifically designed simply to harm a coexecutive col-
league who is a rival or who is from another political party. A 
 
 106. See id. at 67–69. 
 107. See id. at 68. 
 108. See id. at 67–68.  
 109. See id.  
 110. See Herbert Kaufman, Major Players: Bureaucracies in American Gov-
ernment, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 18, 31 (2001). 
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war coexecutive thus might engage in saber rattling to scuttle 
key trade-normalization plans just before the trade coexecutive 
has to stand for reelection. Such schizophrenic policies would 
waste resources and could cripple the government, especially in 
its ability to manage foreign affairs.111 
E.  ENERGY 
Fifth, Berry and Gersen’s plural-executive proposal would 
fatally sap what Alexander Hamilton called “energy in the ex-
ecutive,” which is essential to good government.112 The Presi-
dent must be vigorous in enforcing the laws, defending the na-
tion, and directing the affairs of state.113 The ability to act 
effectively and decisively is as essential to the executive as the 
ability to deliberate is essential to the Legislature.114 Good gov-
ernment requires an energetic President who can both enforce 
acts of Congress and also the judgments of the judicial 
branch.115 Thus, it is the President who swears an oath “to pre-
serve, protect, and defend” the Constitution.116 Defending the 
Constitution was a key concern in 1789, when our young nation 
was highly vulnerable to threats from within and abroad.117 It 
would strain credibility to claim that the intervening centu-
ries—with the advances they have brought in the speed of 
communication and transportation—have reduced the need for 
an energetic President. Energy itself requires fortitude and dis-
cretion. As Alexander Hamilton long ago argued, fortitude 
comes from the President having an independent, popular elec-
toral mandate from Congress118 and from a sufficiently long 
term in office.119 Discretion comes from the personal quality of 
 
 111. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 348–50 
(discussing the harm to international reputation and to domestic industry 
from instability in the government). 
 112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 391.  
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 392. 
 115. See id. (“Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the defini-
tion of good government.”). 
 116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (directing the President to “preserve, protect, 
and defend the Constitution of the United States”). 
 117. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2–6 (John Jay) (regarding the threat of for-
eign wars), NOS. 7–8 (Alexander Hamilton) (regarding the threat of internal 
wars), supra note 2. 
 118. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 
381. 
 119. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 
402–03. 
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the individual holding the presidential office120 and an encom-
passing view of the national interest.121 
The exercise of good judgment in using power is essential 
in the executive branch. Unbundling of the kind Berry and 
Gersen advocate would reduce good judgment in the executive 
branch by forcing coexecutives to focus narrowly on only part of 
the impact of their policy decisions. Coexecutives might act op-
timally with respect to one policy dimension but in a way that 
would still be detrimental overall because of its impact on the 
efficacy of other policies controlled by other coexecutives. Un-
bundling also saps the strength of the executive branch by eli-
minating its ability to act as one cohesive unit.  
Accountability provides both the stick and the carrot for 
energy in the Executive. The stick is the threat that is always 
present of ouster from office, and the carrot is the benefit that 
is always desired of reelection or the election of one’s chosen 
successor. These two come together in motivating the President 
to be energetic. A bundled unitary executive focuses voter at-
tention and accountability whereas, as we have just shown, 
coexecutives are less accountable to voters. Lack of accountabil-
ity reduces the incentive for coexecutives to be aggressive in 
pursuing their policies. When accountability declines, the cost 
of shirking also declines because the probability of being voted 
 
 120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 376–
77. As Berry and Gersen agree, it is unlikely that coexecutives would be of 
much lower quality than a single President, since the difference in power and 
prestige would be so minor and few close substitutes would exist for coexecu-
tive offices. It is also unlikely that the creation of coexecutives would increase 
the overall quality of decision making in the executive branch. Coexecutives 
would be political experts, just as presidents are political experts. Since indi-
viduals have finite skills and talents, there is no reason why we should expect 
that an expert politician would have a lot of expertise in substantive policy 
fields. Our appointment process for picking cabinet secretaries, together with 
the Incompatibility Clause, has combined to produce exactly the result pre-
dicted by Hamilton: the appointment and confirmation of qualified specialists 
adept in managing large organizations and sharing common policy goals. See 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (ALEXANDER HAMILTON), supra note 2, at 423–24. Re-
placing some of the substantive expertise and management ability of the cur-
rent cabinet with the additional specialized expertise that is needed to win 
popular elections would be a mistake.  
 121. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 
411 (predicting that the national perspective of the President will serve to 
check the factional interests in Congress, protecting the nation from improper 
or hastily enacted laws). 
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out of office for shirking drops.122 In other words, the price of 
leisure for coexecutives is lower than it is for a more accounta-
ble unitary executive while the cost of working remains the 
same.123 In relation to this, the value of work to one of many 
coexecutives as compared to the value of work to a unitary ex-
ecutive is likely lower as well, since coexecutives will control 
only a portion of the total executive power. This means the 
same individual would find it optimal to spend more time on 
leisure or shirking when serving as a coexecutive than when 
serving as a President. 
This incentive to shirk that the Berry-Gersen model 
creates may set a bad example for a co-president’s subordinates 
in the bureaucracy who may thus shirk themselves.124 Berry 
and Gersen might respond by arguing that simply having more 
executives rather than only one would actually increase energy 
in the executive branch. But it is not the number of executives 
that are the key to energy in the executive; it is instead the in-
centives those executives face that are the key to energy. Less 
accountable Berry-Gersen coexecutives will have more of an in-
centive to shirk than does the President under our current uni-
tary executive. 
The incentives that Berry-Gersen coexecutives would face 
are akin to those faced by bureaucrats.125 One particular incen-
tive of bureaucrats comes from their knowledge that it is easier 
to get blamed for a policy action that fails than it is to get 
blamed for failing to act.126 Taking any action creates potential 
liability for Berry-Gersen coexecutives. Some actions might 
clearly improve the image of a coexecutive; others might be 
harmful. The key point is that in all of the close cases, coexecu-
tives will have little incentive to act since the result could be 
 
 122. See HINDMOOR, supra note 48, at 134–35 (discussing principal-agent 
problems); MUELLER, supra note 53, at 367 (examining the effects of monitor-
ing on the behavior of bureaucracies). 
 123. See generally HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 172–
76 (presenting the basic labor-leisure decision). 
 124. Just as monitoring by voters reduces the potential for shirking by 
elected officials, monitoring by an energetic President reduces the potential for 
shirking by subordinate officials. See HINDMOOR, supra note 48, at 134–35. 
 125. See generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRE-
SENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 53–55, 120–23 (1971) (providing a general overview 
of some of the costs and incentives that guide bureaucratic decision making). 
 126. See HENRY I. MILLER, TO AMERICA’S HEALTH 42–43 (2000) (discussing 
the incentives in the FDA favoring excessive caution to avoid negative publici-
ty); Russell S. Sobel & Peter T. Leeson, Government’s Response to Hurricane 
Katrina: A Public Choice Analysis, 127 PUB. CHOICE 55, 58–59 (2006). 
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negative, in which case the coexecutive would lose crucial voter 
support. Coexecutives who fail to act will be able to blame their 
coexecutive colleagues for any resulting harm. As anyone who 
has followed the inaction of the Food and Drug Administration 
over the years will know,127 this is precisely the incentive prob-
lem faced by bureaucrats. Inaction should lead to blame, not 
the avoidance of responsibility.  
Unitary executives may be, and are blamed both for acting 
or failing to act because they are more accountable. The fact 
that the President is responsible for all executive policies 
means that he cannot “pass the buck” for a failure to act.128 The 
President thus has an incentive to be energetic, which incentive 
Berry-Gersen coexecutives lack. Nothing would be more harm-
ful to energy in the executive branch than having a bunch of 
coexecutives with a bureaucratic incentive structure, but this is 
precisely what would result if we moved to Berry-Gersen style 
unbundling. 
A President has the unique ability to set priorities among 
competing demands. Because government has limited re-
sources, a key component of energy in the executive is not 
simply taking action but also directing resources toward their 
most efficient uses.129 An energetic executive has to maximize 
the use of the resources at hand given budgetary and other 
constraints. This process of maximizing resources will occur dif-
ferently under a constitution with one President rather than 
several, especially where coexecutives disagree. Coordination is 
integral to energy in the executive because an efficient execu-
tive branch will also effectively be a more energetic executive 
branch. Even if Berry-Gersen style coexecutives were indivi-
dually as energetic as one unitary executive, coexecutives 
would lack the incentive to consider the external effects of their 
actions on their coexecutive colleagues.  
Coexecutives cannot prioritize executive resources and fo-
cus their combined energy on the biggest problems of the na-
tion. They must instead focus on their own policy dimensions. A 
natural resources coexecutive would thus focus on the growing 
demand for resources; an environmental coexecutive would fo-
 
 127. See MILLER, supra note 126. 
 128. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 32 (discussing the unique posi-
tion of the President as a lightning rod for criticism). 
 129. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 
391 (“[A] government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in 
practice, a bad government.”). 
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cus on the problems of pollution; and a war coexecutive would 
focus on national security. It is easy to see how taking such a 
narrow approach to problems might impair an energetic execu-
tive by creating incentives to behave inefficiently. This is an in-
evitable result of the institutional incentives created by having 
coexecutives, which prevents the balancing of competing de-
mands. A unitary executive fares far better in dealing with 
such coordination problems, and as a result, it is a unitary ex-
ecutive, not unbundled coexecutives, that will maximize energy 
in the executive branch. 
F.  THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AND PREFERENCE INTENSITY 
Sixth, Berry and Gersen’s system of coexecutives would ig-
nore the intensity of voter preferences across policy dimensions 
as compared with a unitary-executive system. By requiring a 
single vote on the entire executive agenda, unitary-executive 
systems actually work quite well in weighing individual prefe-
rence intensity, which is important because we ought not only 
care about what viewpoints get majority support but also how 
intensely those viewpoints are held.130 It may seem somewhat 
heretical even to question whether the policy preferences of a 
simple majority of voters ought always to prevail, but scholars 
have long raised such doubts.131 We do not leave all issues in 
our polity to be resolved by majority vote but require superma-
jorities for constitutional amendments.132 Indeed, at the level of 
constitutional design, we deliberately choose institutional 
structures and voting processes that we think will best trans-
late individual preferences into social preferences.133  
One problem any constitution-writer must face is how to 
deal with the fact that individual preferences134 may vary in in-
 
 130. Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. 
L. REV. 434 (1998) (arguing that referenda and other single-issue plebiscitary 
voting mechanisms are contrary to populism because they eliminate the intra-
personal weighing of issues that occur in multi-issue elections). See generally 
VARIAN, supra note 123, at 54–58 (discussing the difference between cardinal 
and ordinal utility). 
 131. See generally MUELLER, supra note 53, chs. 7–8 (presenting simple 
and complex alternatives to majority voting). 
 132. See U.S. CONST. art. V.  
 133. See Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, Constitutional Choice, in THE 
ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 87, at 117, 117. 
 134. Michael J.G. Cain, Social Choice Theory, in THE ELGAR COMPANION 
TO PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 87, at 83, 83. 
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tensity.135 It is inherently quite hard to address the question of 
varying degrees of individual preference intensity because 
there is no common basis or metric on which interpersonal 
comparisons of utility can be made.136 The utility person A may 
get from watching a baseball game can be compared with the 
utility person A gets from going to a movie because Person A 
can choose between the two. But the utility Person A gets from 
watching a baseball game cannot be compared with the utility 
Person B derives from watching a baseball game as is ex-
plained in the well-developed literature on the interpersonal 
incomparability of utility.137 The impossibility of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility makes it impossible to aggregate indi-
vidual preferences into a social welfare function.  
Strikingly, however, an election for a bundled unitary ex-
ecutive can help take into account preference intensities in a 
way that elections for multiple unbundled executives might 
not. While it is true that preference intensities cannot be com-
pared between individuals, they can be compared between poli-
cy choices faced by each individual. As all politicians know, vot-
ers care more about some issues than others.138 Consider the 
response of a voter in a presidential election to a choice be-
tween two candidates, each of whom represents a bundle of pol-
icies. Each voter is compelled to weigh and then vote on his 
overall preference for either the various policies in the bundle 
represented by Candidate A or the different policy bundle 
represented by Candidate B. This requires each person to make 
an intrapersonal utility calculus. While interpersonal utility 
comparisons cannot be made, intrapersonal utility comparison 
is the basis of modern economics and of public choice scholar-
ship itself.139  
Weak preferences on some policies will yield in every indi-
vidual’s intrapersonal utility calculus to stronger preferences in 
other policy dimensions. Far from creating a democratic distor-
tion, this intrapersonal weighing of utility in unitary executive 
 
 135. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CON-
SENT 125–26 (1962). 
 136. RIKER, supra note 66, at 111. 
 137. See id. at 111–13. 
 138. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 135, at 125–26; HINICH & 
MUNGER, supra note 91, at 26. 
 139. See MUELLER, supra note 53, at 1–2 (“The basic behavioral postulate 
of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility 
maximizer.”). This is nothing more nor less than the assumption of rational 
utility maximization. 
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elections forces voters to make a single decision based on the 
strength of their preferences across policy dimensions. A voter 
who disagrees with most policies of his favored candidate is 
thus a voter with a strong preference for that candidate’s posi-
tions on the remaining issues or issue—think abortion. In this 
way, a single election for a unitary executive incorporates into 
the election process the internal utility function of the individ-
ual to the greatest degree possible. Some intensity preferences 
may be lost because they are in the losing bundle of the two 
bundles. But preference intensity is better accounted for than if 
all issue positions were perfectly unbundled—in which case 
even very weak majority preferences would always trump 
strongly held slight-minority positions. 
To see why this is so, consider what happens when there 
are multiple elections for Berry-Gersen style coexecutives. The 
first and primary difference between bundled and unbundled 
executive elections is quite obvious: there are more coexecutives 
and thus more elections and choices on the ballot. The voter 
must choose among candidates for each policy dimension, ra-
ther than selecting one candidate for all policy areas. Coexecu-
tive elections allow voters to choose their preferred policies in 
multiple dimensions. This is the great advantage claimed by 
Berry and Gersen.140 However, it is not clear that this is indeed 
an advantage. As described below, the ability to partially weigh 
voter preference intensity is important in comparing systems of 
elected government.141 The coexecutive system greatly reduces 
intrapersonal internal weighing of policy preferences. In its 
purest form, where there is a separate election for every single 
policy issue, the information is simply discarded because voters 
will be able to vote their weakest, as well as their most strongly 
held policy preferences.142 
Unbundling these policy preferences is a bad thing because 
it eliminates the need for individuals to weigh, vote, and reveal 
their preference intensities across policies. We think preference 
intensity ought to matter. A constitutional system with a single 
unitary-executive election will do a better job than a system 
with several coexecutive elections in faithfully and completely 
 
 140. Berry & Gersen, supra note 6, at 1387 (“Unbundling executive author-
ity enhances democratic accountability and government performance . . . .”). 
 141. Part II.H, infra, specifically discusses the constitutional choice be-
tween voting rules, but this applies with equal force to the decision of bundling 
or unbundling decisions on government action. 
 142. The argument then becomes similar to Clark’s argument against voter 
initiatives. Clark, supra note 130, at 467–73. 
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aggregating the preferences of voters. Counterintuitive though 
it may be, policy bundling actually leads to a more sophisti-
cated sampling of the popular will.  
The natural response is to note that preference intensity 
must be dropped at some point in a fair electoral process: it 
cannot ultimately be taken account of in a unitary-executive 
election on the final vote between Candidate A and Candidate 
B. The response to this is to note that plurality elections for one 
President have a dynamic aspect to them because candidates 
will always have an incentive to try to poach on one another’s 
issue bundles. This is what keeps candidates in such elections 
close to the preferences of the median voters.143 Remove a 
plank that voters care about, and the party loses support. In 
this way and over time, a bundled unitary-executive election 
will give candidates an incentive to consider the strength of 
voter preferences over the whole universe of policies. Candi-
dates will respond to that incentive, and the party that ignores 
the intensity of voter preferences will do so to its detriment 
over the long run. 
This raises another point about preference intensity and 
the advantages of a unitary executive which pertains to the 
mechanics of the way in which unbundled elections might be 
held. Such elections might be held at the same time in one elec-
tion cycle or they might be held concurrently in a series of elec-
tions.144 Simultaneous election of coexecutives would hurt 
strongly held minority positions, while concurrent election of 
coexecutives would so privilege strongly held minority positions 
that the result would be special-interest capture. 
The explanation for this grows out of a weighing of the 
marginal cost of casting a vote for any of the various coexecu-
tives. Just as voters must incur a cost in getting information, 
they must incur a cost in voting.145 Registration, travelling to 
the polls, waiting in line, waking up early on election day, and 
similar acts are all direct costs of voting.146 For many voters, 
the costs are simply not worth the value of their votes.147 This 
 
 143. See RIKER, supra note 66, at 85–88. 
 144. The analysis that follows does not change substantively if multiple 
coexecutives are elected in each of a series of elections. Indeed, such a system 
would create additional opportunities for strategic manipulation regarding 
which of the coexecutives share elections. 
 145. HINDMOOR, supra note 48, at 28. 
 146. See DOWNS, supra note 46, at 265. 
 147. Id. at 260; MUELLER, supra note 53, at 305 (“[I]n deciding whether to 
vote, a rational voter must calculate the probability that her vote will make or 
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portion of the electorate forfeits their votes by failing to cast a 
ballot. This is a frequent occurrence in midterm elections, 
where voter turnout drops substantially and where those most 
opposed to the administration in power in the White House 
disproportionately turn out to vote.148  
The simultaneous election of several coexecutives together 
reduces the marginal cost of voting for any additional coexecu-
tive candidate to nearly zero. Voters will have an incentive to 
vote on all candidates once they are in the voting booth since 
the major costs of voting will have already been incurred in get-
ting to the voting booth, and the savings of a few additional 
seconds to cast an extra vote is trivial. Even if the voter knows 
nothing about the candidates and has weak preferences in the 
policy dimension in question, uninformed and uninterested vot-
ers will still be able to vote along party lines and get a small 
benefit for almost no additional cost.149 
Voter turnout is likely to be higher in simultaneous elec-
tions than in concurrent elections. Any member of the electo-
rate who gets value from voting for any or all of the coexecu-
tives will turn out to vote. And once in the booth, he will vote 
for them all. This substantially hurts minorities with strong 
policy preferences on issues. Unlike the situation under a uni-
tary-executive presidential system, the strength of voter prefe-
rences will not be reflected in their votes. As such, any weak 
preference suffices to motivate a vote once at the polls. A plu-
rality of these weak preferences in each separate policy dimen-
sion will suffice to elect its candidate, regardless of the strength 
of the opposition.150 This would be a bad thing, compared to the 
unitary-executive presidential elections we now have, because 
intensely held preferences will get less weight, so the simulta-
neous election of coexecutives is undesirable. 
The problem is that the concurrent election of multiple 
coexecutives in separate elections in different years has exactly 
the opposite effect. Rather than driving the marginal cost of 
voting to zero, concurrent elections, like midterm elections, 
drive the marginal cost of voting up substantially. A higher 
marginal cost of voting will discourage those with either high 
 
break a tie . . . . This probability . . . becomes infinitesimal as [the number of 
voters] becomes large.”). 
 148. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 32, at 2619–20. 
 149. See HINICH & MUNGER, supra note 91, at 208 (“[I]deology serves as a 
means of reducing the costs of gathering information.”). 
 150. See Clark, supra note 130, at 434–36. 
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costs or with low value from voting. The only voters who will 
find it worth the costs of going to the polls in such elections will 
be those who care a lot about the outcome of the election. This 
is a characteristic of midterm elections, where voter participa-
tion plummets as the ratio of value to cost declines.151  
Lower turnout in midterm or concurrent elections has the 
advantage of screening out those voters who have only weak 
preferences, but it has the disadvantage that it drives out vot-
ers with high costs of voting and so facilitates special-interest 
capture.152 Separate concurrent elections, like midterm elec-
tions, would be a bad thing because they would over-represent 
the preferences of minorities.153 Thus, neither simultaneous nor 
concurrent election of Berry-Gersen style coexecutives would 
work as successfully as has election of our one unitary execu-
tive.  
G.  THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AND CYCLING 
Seventh, Berry and Gersen’s coexecutive proposal is flawed 
because it overlooks the fact that the creation of a unitary ex-
ecutive is desirable because it helps ameliorate the problem of 
cycling. All voting systems are plagued by the fact that they 
must attempt to construct the “will of the people” out of the re-
vealed preferences of many voters. The very idea that there is 
such a thing as the popular will may be a useful theoretical 
construct, but it is actually something of a mirage. Anything we 
could call the popular will must, in reality, be some aggregation 
of individual preferences.154 While rational individuals have 
transitive preferences,155 intransitive voting cycles, where poli-
cy A is preferred to policy B is preferred to policy C is preferred 
to policy A (A > B > C > A), can arise as a result of aggrega-
tion.156 Plurality voting leads to this cycle if there are three 
voters with the following preferences: A > B > C, B > C > A, and 
C > A > B. Thus, although each policy either wins or loses 
against every other policy in pair-wise comparison, this prefe-
rence distribution does not have any policy that defeats all oth-
 
 151. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 32, at 2619. 
 152. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 12 (1971) (noting that small minorities with strong pre-
ferences find the costs of procuring favorable regulation lowest). 
 153. See id.  
 154. RIKER, supra note 66, at 31. 
 155. Id. at 17. Transitivity requires that if A > B and B > C, then A > C. 
 156. Id. at 18. 
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er policies (known as a Condorcet winner).157 Such voting cycles 
have distressed political scientists for centuries,158 but the 
prospects of a perfect voting system famously became infinitely 
bleaker with the publication by Kenneth Arrow of Social Choice 
and Individual Values.159 This work set out a mathematical 
proof that no voting system simultaneously satisfies “certain 
natural conditions” that are desirable in any democratic voting 
system.160 This result came to be known as Arrow’s Impossibili-
ty Theorem.161 Arrow’s own work was highly mathematical, but 
it gained prominence following William Riker’s explanation in 
Liberalism Against Populism.162  
Following Riker, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem states that 
no method of voting can satisfy four basic conditions: universal 
domain (U),163 Pareto optimality (P),164 independence of irrele-
vant alternatives (IIA),165 and non-dictatorship (D).166 An out-
come is Pareto efficient if there is no other alternative that 
could make at least one voter better off without making any 
voters worse off.167 Suppose voters have the following prefe-
rence orderings: A > B > C, B > C > A, and B > A > C. In this 
example, C is not Pareto optimal because B > C for every voter. 
The same result would hold if any of the voters were indifferent 
among any of the alternatives. The theorem further assumes 
that a voting mechanism actually chooses some outcome.168 The 
problem is that there is no outcome among A, B, and C that will 
satisfy a majority of the voters when voting cycles exist. Accor-
dingly, if pair-wise votes can be held over and over again, cycl-
 
 157. See HINDMOOR, supra note 48, at 80–81. 
 158. Id. at 81 (noting that the problem has been independently considered 
by the Marquis de Condorcet, Charles Dodgson, and Kenneth Arrow). 
 159. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951). 
 160. Id. at 2. 
 161. HINDMOOR, supra note 48, at 83. 
 162. RIKER, supra note 66, at 115–36. 
 163. Condition U requires that voter preferences must be free to span the 
universal domain of all possible rankings of alternatives. Id. at 116–17.  
 164. Condition P is the powerfully simple requirement that any outcome of 
the voting mechanism must be Pareto optimal. See id. at 117–18.  
 165. Condition IIA precludes the outcome from depending on changes in 
other alternatives that are not relevant to the decision. Id. at 118.  
 166. Condition D requires that no individual voter has controlling prefe-
rences. Id.  
 167. RIKER, supra note 66, at 270. 
 168. See id. at 119–20. Additional technical details are left out for clarity 
and convenience. A thorough analysis of this theorem would require a good 
deal more space and qualified statements, but it would add little value to the 
present discussion. 
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ing will occur as there is a majority to reject any of the possible 
outcomes A, B, or C. 
It is important to note that voting cycles cannot occur when 
there are two alternatives, so Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is 
solved in such cases.169 In unitary-executive presidential elec-
tions, there are typically only two such alternatives whereas in 
Berry-Gersen elections for multiple coexecutives, there would 
be more than two such alternatives. Thus, a unitary-executive 
election would seem to reduce cycling. Unfortunately, Riker 
reminds the prematurely optimistic that arbitrarily narrowing 
the field to two candidates simply pushes the problem back one 
stage.170 Thus, if general elections are free of cycling, it is only 
because primary elections have arbitrarily narrowed the field. 
However, the narrowing of the field in primary elections is not 
entirely arbitrary. A party that constantly runs candidates too 
far from the median voter will find itself perpetually out of of-
fice, which is why plurality voting in geographically specified 
districts produces a two-party system.171 Riker himself, for this 
reason, endorsed plurality voting as a response to the problem 
of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem,172 and election of one Presi-
dent and Vice President by national majority vote does seem in 
practice to work reasonably well in representing the median 
voter and in satisfying the conditions of Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem.  
Elections are only the beginning. The policy choices of 
elected officials (be they coexecutives or representatives in the 
legislature) are also susceptible to exactly the same problem. 
This is obviously true with respect to legislatures since they ac-
tually vote on policy decisions and can cycle as easily as voters 
themselves. Legislatures respond to the problem of cycling 
through agenda control, which somewhat arbitrarily removes 
Pareto-preferred alternatives in early rounds of voting.173 As 
with legislatures, the substitution of coexecutives for a unitary 
executive could lead to Pareto-inefficient outcomes and to cycl-
ing. A unitary executive elected by plurality vote is a uniquely 
elegant solution to the problem of Arrow’s Impossibility Theo-
 
 169. ARROW, supra note 159, at 46–48. 
 170. See RIKER, supra note 66, at 65. 
 171. This result is known as Duverger’s Law. See id. at 145. 
 172. Id. at 113. 
 173. HINDMOOR, supra note 48, at 88. 
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rem. Strong dynamic effects serve to keep the choices offered in 
the general election fairly close to the median voter.174 
H.  A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE ON THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 
DEBATE 
Eighth, Berry and Gersen’s coexecutive model is less desir-
able than having a unitary executive for reasons spelled out in 
Buchanan and Tullock’s masterpiece The Calculus of Con-
sent.175 Buchanan and Tullock model constitutional voting rules 
as a simple cost-minimization problem176 that considers two 
costs faced by all the voters in a society: (1) external costs and 
(2) decision costs.177 External costs are all the expected costs of 
government actions that could in theory produce a net harm to 
the individual.178 Thus, for example, special-interest projects 
that divert general tax revenue for the benefit of others would 
be examples of external costs. External costs decrease as the 
percentage of votes needed to take a governmental action rises 
since each voter has greater power to block harmful govern-
ment actions.179  
Decision costs, in contrast, are those costs involved in 
reaching an agreement on any given beneficial government ac-
tion.180 These include the costs of coordination and bargain-
ing.181 Decision costs increase as the percentage of votes needed 
to take action rises because a smaller number of voters suffices 
to block government actions.182 The goal of constitutional de-
sign is thus to choose the voting rule that minimizes the total 
expected costs to all voters.183 
Socially optimal voting rules need not be majority voting or 
plurality voting. In fact, supermajorities are commonly re-
quired for amending constitutions.184 At one end of the spec-
 
 174. RIKER, supra note 66, at 85–88. 
 175. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 135. 
 176. Id. at 70. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 64. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 68–69. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. (stating that strategic bargaining becomes a major problem as the 
rule approaches unanimity). 
 183. Id. at 70. 
 184. See, e.g., 1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.) (requiring three-fifths approval 
when the government submits an amendment to both Houses of Parliament 
convened in Congress instead of to the Houses acting separately, in which case 
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trum, in America, Article V of the Constitution sets a high re-
quirement for amendment,185 indicating a greater concern with 
external costs. At the opposite end of the spectrum is Britain. 
There the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy allows Parlia-
ment to amend the constitution by majority vote,186 indicating a 
greater concern with decision costs. 
Institutional structures can also be used to minimize the 
costs of government, especially external costs. Buchanan and 
Tullock point out that bicameralism is one such structure.187 
Dividing the legislature into two houses with different districts 
increases the number of voters necessary to acquiesce in spe-
cial-interest acts.188 By differentiating the constituencies of 
members of the houses, the bicameral system effectively re-
quires a double majority for legislation. Such a double majority 
is easily found for actions of broad benefit to the nation, but it 
increases the costs of special-interest projects.189 The bicameral 
legislature thus acts as a filter for special-interest legislation. It 
reduces external costs without substantially raising decision 
costs. 
A strong unitary executive also lowers both external costs 
and decision costs just as bicameralism does. The President 
must answer to the entire nation and must consider all the ef-
fects and penumbras of executive actions.190 Coexecutives must 
likewise consider the entire nation but will likely only consider 
the direct effects of their policies in their own policy-making 
dimension. Presidents, in contrast, will weigh all direct and in-
direct effects of policies, and they will better protect minority 
interests. The unitary executive thus reduces both costs of gov-
 
simple majority approval must be followed by referendum); GRUNDGESETZ 
FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (Federal Constitution) art. 79, §§ 2–
3 (F.R.G.) (requiring two-thirds approval of both houses to amend the Basic 
Law, although certain provisions are not amendable).  
 185. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 186. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 84 (8th ed. 1915). 
 187. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 135, at 236 (“[I]f the basis of re-
presentation can be made significantly different in the two houses, the institu-
tion of the bicameral legislature may prove to be an effective means of secur-
ing a substantial reduction in the expected external costs of collective action 
without incurring as much added decision-making costs as a more inclusive 
rule would involve in a single house.”). 
 188. Id. at 242.  
 189. See id. at 247–48 (noting the possibility that a bill supported by a geo-
graphically concentrated House majority could fail in the Senate). 
 190. Id. at 248. 
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ernment—making it more efficient—while the coexecutive sys-
tem increases both costs of government—making it less effi-
cient. 
Minorities with strong interests will lobby unitary execu-
tives to implement preferred policies.191 Because a President 
must accept both the praise and blame for such policies, he 
must weigh the relative value of such policies to their propo-
nents and opponents.192 This reduces external costs because if a 
policy produces great harm to some voters without offsetting 
value to others, those harmed will be able to prevail on the ex-
ecutive for some relief. A unitary executive, which is responsive 
to strong minority preferences as to which the majority is al-
most indifferent, will thus reduce the expected external costs of 
government without adding to decision costs, just as bicameral-
ism does. 
Creation of a unitary executive as opposed to Berry-Gersen 
style coexecutives also decreases decision costs in two ways. 
First, at the election stage, the costs of electing one executive 
are obviously less than the costs of electing several. Second, at 
the stage of policy implementation, a unitary executive will 
have lower coordination costs. For these reasons, a unitary ex-
ecutive can be expected to reduce overall both the external 
costs and the decision costs of government action, leading to 
greater efficiency under the Buchanan-Tullock model. 
I.  PRESENTMENT AND THE COEXECUTIVE VETO 
A ninth problem with Berry and Gersen’s proposal is that 
it is hard to square with retention of the presidential veto. The 
veto is desirable both because it reinforces the separation of 
powers and because it adds a national perspective to lawmak-
ing.193 The veto power gives the executive branch a vital wea-
pon with which to counterbalance Congress’s power of the 
 
 191. See id. at 135–40 (presenting a model of logrolling that allows minori-
ties to obtain some of their preferred policies by agreeing to support others); 
HINDMOOR, supra note 48, at 168–69 (describing the benefits to minorities 
with strong preferences from logrolling). 
 192. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 135, at 134–35 (describing implicit 
logrolling by which politicians offer policy combinations that appeal in differ-
ent degrees to different voters). 
 193. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 
411 (“The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the 
executive, is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase 
the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, 
through haste, inadvertence, or design.”). 
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purse. The veto’s protection of the national interest is, of 
course, subject to override by two-thirds of both houses of Con-
gress,194 but this supermajority requirement itself promotes a 
national focus on legislation by increasing the size of the mini-
mum winning coalition necessary to enact a law.195 Legislation 
Congress enacts over a veto must benefit at least two-thirds of 
the states and two-thirds of the people,196 which in turn in-
creases the amount of “logrolling” that must go on to enact a 
bill over a president’s veto.197 Thus, the requirement of pre-
sentment adds a national perspective to the lawmaking 
process. 
The veto has, in fact, proven to be so successful, even 
though it was originally controversial,198 that all of the states 
have emulated the federal system and given their governors ve-
toes.199 Many states have gone even further by giving their 
governors a line-item veto,200 which our president lacks.201 Ber-
ry and Gersen say that the presidential veto could be retained 
in a system of coexecutives, but we do not see how this is possi-
ble. The veto would have to either be given to one coordination 
coexecutive, who would then be a first among equals, or it 
would have to be shared by each coexecutive in his own policy 
dimension. Both these ideas are highly problematic. 
The states, of course, have opted for one coordination coex-
ecutive, the governor, who alone has a veto.202 As a result, this 
 
 194. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 7. 
 195. See MUELLER, supra note 53, at 281. 
 196. Strictly speaking, it need only benefit half the voters of those states 
and half the population of each congressional district of the supporting repre-
sentatives. However, it is conventional to speak of the districts and states as 
discrete units, adding clarity without substantively changing the underlying 
logic. 
 197. HINDMOOR, supra note 48, at 172. 
 198. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 411–
12 (rejecting arguments against the veto power). 
 199. Last Governor Without Veto Could Get It: Legislature Overcomes Co-
lonial-Era Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, at 27 (noting that North Carolina 
was the last state without a gubernatorial veto). 
 200. Only six states have refused their governors the line-item veto entire-
ly. See IND. CONST. art. V, § 14; NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 35; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, 
art. 44; N.C. CONST. art. II, § 22; R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 14; VT. CONST. ch. II, 
§ 11. 
 201. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (holding that 
the Line Item Veto Act violated the Presentment Clause). 
 202. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. I, § 1, art. II (“No bill or resolve of the 
senate or house of representatives shall become a law, and have force as such, 
until it shall have been laid before the governor for his revisal . . . .”); N.Y. 
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“veto coexecutive” governor exerts substantial control over all 
policy dimensions, which makes the state-executive systems in 
some ways a lot like the presidential-executive system, as noted 
above. The coexecutive or governor who has the veto power con-
trols the other coexecutives to a substantial degree. 
Such a hybrid system of coexecutives with a coordinator 
coexecutive will suffer from both coordination and accountabili-
ty problems that neither a unitary executive nor a Berry-
Gersen system of coexecutives, each armed with vetoes in their 
own area, would face. Although the coexecutive with the veto 
would have no power to enforce coordination among the other 
coexecutives, he would have the power to hinder coordination 
by vetoing bills another coexecutive might want passed. As a 
result, the sharp and distinct allocations of policy dimensions 
which Berry and Gersen concede are essential for their scheme 
to work would be lost. All of the problems we associate with ex-
ecutive councils thus return when there is one coexecutive with 
the veto power.203 
What then about giving each coexecutive a coequal veto in 
his own policy dimension? The problem with this division of the 
veto power is that it destroys executive-branch independence. 
The veto power is vital because it protects the executive from 
encroachments by Congress.204 Giving the coexecutives veto 
powers over their respective policy dimensions would create a 
problem even if the policy dimensions were clearly distinct. Ei-
ther Congress would have the power to pick which coexecutive 
to send a bill to or the judiciary would have to be harnessed to 
make that decision. Both of these alternatives are manifestly 
implausible on their face. Dividing the veto will inevitably 
 
CONST. art. IV, § 7 (“Every bill which shall have passed the senate and assem-
bly shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor . . . .”). 
 203. How have the states persevered with such hybrid systems for so long? 
The answer is that they have not. The state constitutions do not remove en-
tirely any substantial portion of the executive power from their governors. 
While the coexecutives in state governments are independently elected, they 
still report to the governor—in whom alone the executive power is vested. See, 
e.g., ILL. CONST. art. V, § 8 (“The Governor shall have the supreme executive 
power, and shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws.”); MICH. 
CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The executive power is vested in the governor.”); PA. 
CONST. art. IV, § 10 (“The Governor may require information in writing from 
the officers of the Executive Department, upon any subject relating to the du-
ties of their respective offices.”). Exactly how much independence these subor-
dinate, independently elected officials actually have is an interesting empirical 
question, but one that is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 204. See Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 1, at 81. 
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greatly weaken the executive branch relative to Congress, and 
we think that is a bad thing.205 
J.  THE LESSON FROM THE STATES FOR THE FEDERAL 
EXECUTIVE 
And the tenth and final flaw with the Berry and Gersen 
model is that Berry and Gersen defend their system of coexecu-
tives by claiming it has worked in the states,206 but they over-
look the fact that the experience in the states has been far from 
universally positive.207 They also overlook vital differences be-
tween the federal government and the states. Thus, it is true as 
Berry and Gersen claim that many states have successfully 
used elective coexecutive systems since the nineteenth cen-
tury.208 It must be remembered, however, that they have done 
so in a polity where the stabilizing influence of a federal gov-
ernment with a unitary executive prevented the complete 
breakdowns of government which could follow from the unbun-
dling of executive power. There are big differences between the 
states and the federal government which suggest that a system 
of coexecutives might work in the one but not in the other. 
First, it is not nearly as critical that state executives be 
able to act with great energy, dispatch, and force as it is with 
the federal executive. Governors do not engage in diplomatic 
and trade negotiations with foreign nations, nor must they sa-
feguard their states’ very existence from foreign and domestic 
threats. The federal executive must do all of these things. As 
President Harry S. Truman said famously of the federal execu-
tive branch, “the buck stops here.”209 
Second, the federal government’s responsibility for foreign 
relations almost requires by itself a unitary executive at the 
federal level. In a system of plural coexecutives, each coexecu-
tive would essentially be able to make decisions with foreign af-
fairs consequences. A trade or environment or social issues 
coexecutive could easily make decisions that would hobble the 
foreign policy coexecutive’s management of external relations.  
 
 205. See id. 
 206. Berry & Gersen, supra note 6, at 1399. 
 207. See Arthur Ludington, Progress of the Short Ballot Movement, in Ho-
race E. Flack, Notes on Current Legislation, 5 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 70, 79–83 
(1911) (discussing early twentieth-century efforts in a number of states to con-
vert most statewide elective offices into positions appointed by the governor). 
 208. See Marshall, supra note 74, at 2452. 
 209. Truman: The Buck Stops Here, Harry S. Truman Library and Mu-
seum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/buckstop.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2009). 
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Finally, the greatest potential for danger would surely be 
in the command of the military. It is obvious that any division 
of the commander-in-chief power among coexecutives would 
place the nation in as precarious a position as it did the Roman 
Republic.210 Even if a single coexecutive were put in charge of 
the armed forces, disputes might well arise during moments of 
national crisis and danger. And, of course, these are precisely 
the moments that most demand executive unity and energy. 
Imagine the Youngstown Steel211 scenario if we then had a sys-
tem of coexecutive power. A war coexecutive might have 
claimed that the threatened strike would harm the war effort. 
A labor coexecutive might have claimed that interference with 
such a strike violated the division of coexecutive powers. Which 
coexecutive would have prevailed and how would the question 
have been decided? Each coexecutive would have had in effect a 
veto over the effective use of resources for the national defense. 
Whatever the wisdom of such a structure at the state level, 
these unique problems faced by the federal government suggest 
that a system of coexecutives would never work at the federal 
level. Could Franklin D. Roosevelt have waged and won World 
War II if he had an elected republican attorney general breath-
ing down his neck? Our answer: no way. 
  CONCLUSION   
We have sought in this Article to present normative argu-
ments in favor of the unitary executive and to expose the costs 
of Berry-Gersen style unbundling. By accounting for preference 
intensity, the presidential unitary executive system offers a 
more sophisticated sampling of the popular will. Such a system 
also promotes informed voting and energy by focusing accoun-
tability on one official. As the proponents of the short ballot 
movement argued long ago at the state level, a unitary-
executive presidential system leads to better government by 
making coordination easier. Energy and coordination are espe-
cially vital in the federal government, where the threats faced 
by the executive branch are very different from those faced by 
the states. Finally, a unitary-executive presidential system 
 
 210. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 
391 (“Every man . . . knows how often [Rome] was obliged to take refuge in the 
absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of dictator . . . .”). 
 211. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582–83 (1952) 
(rejecting the claimed power to seize a steel mill for the purpose of avoiding a 
strike during the Korean War). 
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promotes the separation of powers by providing a strong check 
to the legislature. In contrast, a Berry-Gersen style coexecutive 
system would tend toward a parliamentary system of gover-
nance by the invisible and unaccountable congressional com-
mittees. There would be high costs to going down that road.212 
Such costs were thought too high in 1789,213 and they have not 
gone down in the last 220 years. A plural executive—be it a 
council or a Berry-Gersen system of independent coexecu-
tives—neither promotes nor protects democracy to the degree 
that a unitary executive system does. 
 
 212. See generally Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government, su-
pra note 1. 
 213. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 290–91 
(noting the need to fortify the executive against the legislative authority, 
which “necessarily predominates” in a republican government). 
